The Holocaust and the Neo-Nazi Mythomania
© 1978, The Beate Klarsfeld Foundation
 
 
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"The goal which attracted me was to clearly show this veritable Hitler in his soundings of the future, in his hesitations before the uncertain and in his inhibitions before "the ultimate consequences à la Stalin"."
The taking of ordinary decisions at Hitler's level was described by B. v. Schirach, Führer of the Young People of the Reich and, as of 1940, Gauleiter of Vienna: (74)
"Soon Bormann assured that stenographers registered each of Hitler's words, even at table. Bormann piled up these notes in enormous armoured closets, arranged according to subjects, names, dates... All letters, requests, complaints addressed to Hitler finally landed on Bormann's desk. Hitler saw but a small part of them. Bormann has himself brought from these armoured closets the comments of Hitler concerning the subject treated and afterwards edited the answers in the style and name of his master. Hitler during the year had often expressed the most contradictory opinions on the same subject: Bormann always chose the most extreme, the most brutal. And Hitler always covered for Bormann."
This role of active intermediary that Martin Bormann played in the development of the political and public life of the Third Reich did not concern the special relations of Hitler with Himmler, Heydrich or Kaltenbrunner, successor of Heydrich. But the way in which M. Bormann established decisions in Hitler's name characterized the attitude of Hitler in general: Hitler taught and his collaborators deduced the extreme decisions to be taken, except in foreign policy and in the conduct of the war where Hitler acted personally.

We may cite, too, F. Hossbach, liaison officer of the Wehrmacht with Hitler, who observed Hitler's influencable [sic] character when confronted with accomplished facts: (75)
"There is no doubt that following arbitrary initiatives, taken on their own account by sections of the Party, things often followed an orientation which, in the beginning, was not a agreement with Hitlers [sic] own intentions. In these cases, he was more the party led than leading; and, when they were over, he attributed to himself events which previously he had wanted otherwise or had not wanted at all. However, he seized with passion many accomplished facts with which he was confronted and assimilated them."
It is curious that it occurred to Hitler to personally and publicly make known before the Reichstag his reputation of being indecisive. On July 13, 1934, in an important speech, he commented on the murderous action of June 30 and the following days against the SA (Röhm) and against the politicians that he associated with the tendencies of the latter. At a given moment of his speech, he formulated the argument that the SA had advanced to incite people to revolt against the established Hitlerian regime: (76)
"The necessity of a separate intervention of the SA has been explained by the evocation of my inability to take decisions, which would be overcome only if faits accomplis occurred."
     
   

 
The Holocaust and the Neo-Nazi Mythomania
© 1978, The Beate Klarsfeld Foundation
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