3 Dec. 45

tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment it is up to them. "

"Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe that when the issue arises a period of 46 hours would be indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia's attitude."
The upshot of the talks with the Hungarians proved to be a staff conference on 6 September.

I quote again from Jodl's diary the entry for 6 September, beginning at the end of that same page:

"Chief of General Staff General of Artillery Halder has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the Führer, especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment. The same with OAI General Von Stülpnagel."
It is somewhat interesting to find a high-ranking general giving a briefing on such political matters.

Then we come to final actual preparations for the attack. With a 1 October target date set for Case Green, there was a noticeable increase in the tempo of the military preparation in late August and September. Actual preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were well under way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators was devoted to technical details the timing of "X-days," questions of mobilization, questions of transport and supplies.

On 26 August the Defendant Jodl initialed a memorandum entitled, "Timing of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures." This is item 17 at Pages 37 and 38 of the English translation the Schmundt file on Case Green, our number 388-PS.

I should like to invite the special attention of the Tribunal to this memorandum. It demonstrates beyond the slightest doubt the complicity of the OKW and of Defendant Keitel and Jodl in the shameful fabrication of an incident as an excuse for war. It reveals in bare outline the deceit, the barbarity, the completely criminal character of the attack that Germany was preparing to launch.

I ask leave to read this document in full:

"Chief Section L: for chiefs only; written by General Staff officer; top secret; note on progress of report; Berlin 24 August 1938; access only through officer: 1 copy

"Timing of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Measures.

"The Luftwaffe's endeavor to take the enemy air forces by surprise at their peacetime airports justifiably leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-Order and to demand that the X-Order itself be given sufficiently late on