7 Dec. 45

And then I would like the Court to look at the entry for the 21st of March, which by inadvertence has been included in the next page at the bottom of Page 6:

"Misgivings of Task Force 21 . . . "
The Court has seen from documents that I have put in already that Task Force 21 was Falkenhorst's force, which was detailed to conduct this invasion.

"Misgivings of Task Force 21 about the long interval between taking up readiness positions at 0530 hours and closing of diplomatic negotiations. Führer rejects any earlier negotiations as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken. The political plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military measures taken and even exaggerate them."
Comment upon that entry is, I think, unnecessary. The next entry, if the Court will turn to Page 5, of the 28th of March, the third sentence:

"Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the Weser Exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst and the other three commanders are worrying about matters which are none of their business. Krancke sees more disadvantages than advantages.

"In the evening the Führer visits the map room and roundly declares that he won't stand for the Navy clearing out of the Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim, and Oslo will have to remain occupied by naval forces."
There the Court will observe that Jodl, as ever, is the faithful collaborator of Hitler.

Then April the 2d:

"1530 hours. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and General Von Falkenhorst with the Führer All confirm preparations completed. Führer orders carrying out of the Weser Exercise for April the 9th."
Then the last entry in the next page, the 4th of April:

"Führer drafts the proclamations. Pieckenbrock, Chief of Military Intelligence I, returns with good result from the talks with Quisling in Copenhagen."
Until the very last the treachery of Quisling continued most active.

The Prosecution has in its possession a large number of operation orders that were issued in connection with the aggression against Norway and Denmark, but I propose only to draw the Court's attention to two of them to illustrate the extent of the secrecy and