4 Jan. 46

In essence these directives are: Firstly, statements of what the Armed Forces must be prepared to accomplish in view of political and diplomatic policies and developments and; secondly, indications of what should be accomplished diplomatically in order to make the military tasks easier and the chances of success greater. They constitute, in fact, a fusion of diplomatic and military thought and they strongly demonstrate the mutual interdependence of aggressive diplomacy and military planning.

Note the limited distribution of these documents, early in April 1939, in which the preparation of the plans for the Polish war is ordered. Five copies only are distributed by Keitel: One goes to Brauchitsch at OKH; one to Raeder at OKM; one to Göring at OKL; and two to Warlimont in the planning branch of OKW.

Hitler lays down that the plans must be capable of execution by 1 September 1939; and, as we all remember, that target date was adhered to. The fusion of military and diplomatic thought is clearly brought out by a part of one of these documents which has not previously been read; that is Document C-120, Subdivision D, and it is to be found at Page 4. The sub-heading is "Political Requirements and Aims":
"German relations with Poland continue to be based on the principle of avoiding any quarrels. Should Poland, however, change her policy towards Germany, based up to now on the same principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement might become necessary, notwithstanding the pact in effect with Poland.

"The aim, then, will be to destroy Polish military strength and create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed a part of the Reich territory at the outbreak of the conflict, at the latest.

"The political leadership considers it its task in this case to isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to Poland only.

"The development of increasing internal crises in France and the resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situation in the not too distant future.

"Intervention by Russia, so far as she would be able to do this, cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because this would imply Poland's destruction by Bolshevism.

"The attitude of the Baltic States will be determined wholly by German military exigencies.

"On the German side Hungary cannot be considered a certain ally. Italy's attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis." Sub-heading 2, "Military Conclusions":