4 Jan. 46

And turning to Paragraph Number 5, the "Timetable for the Operations":
"On 5 April as soon as sufficient forces of the Air Forces are available and weather permitting, the Air Forces should attack continuously by day and night the Yugoslav ground organization and Belgrade."
The German attack on the Soviet Union I have little more to say about. The documents showing the aggressive nature of the attack have been put in by Mr. Alderman. I suppose it is quite possible that some members of the General Staff and High Command group opposed Barbarossa as unnecessary and unwise from a military standpoint. The Defendant Raeder so indicated in a memorandum he wrote on 10 January 1944, Document C-66, Exhibit Number GB-81. C-66 is the translation and the only document I propose to read on this subject, from which a few extracts are of interest. The quotation starts at the very outset of the Document C-66:
"At this time the Führer had made known his 'unalterable decision' to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all remonstrances. After that further warnings, if no new situation had arisen, were found to be, according to previous experiences, completely useless. As Chief of naval war staff I was never convinced of the 'compelling necessity' for Barbarossa."
And passing to the third paragraph:
"The Führer very early had the idea of one day settling accounts with Russia; doubtless his general ideological attitude played an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once stated that he intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic power; they would then have to be diverted in the direction of the Persian Gulf. The advance of the Russians against Finland and the Baltic States in 1939-1940 probably further strengthened him in this idea."
And passing to the very end of the document, Paragraph 7, Page 4:
"As no other course is possible, I have submitted to compulsion. If thereby a difference of opinion arises between 1 SKL and myself" — that, if I may interpolate, is a division of the naval war staff having to do with operations — "it is perhaps because the arguments the Führer used on such occasions (dinner speech in the middle of July to the officers in command) to justify a step he had planned usually had a greater effect on People not belonging to the inner circle than on those who often heard this type of reasoning.

"Many remarks and plans indicate that the Führer calculated on the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn